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This paper investigates the speed and completeness of the pass-through
from market rates to mortgage rates in Switzerland. The pass-through dy-
namics are studied under a marginal funding cost perspective. By choos-
ing the appropriate benchmark rates, this study takes into account banks’
forecasts of the evolution of their funding costs. It is found that the pass-
through of rates of adjustable-rate mortgages is incomplete and sluggish
compared to the rates of mortgages with a ﬁxed maturity. For the latter,
changes in market rates appear to be transmitted quickly and completely,
particularly when benchmark rates are falling. This ﬁnding suggests that
a low-interest-rate environment stimulates competition among ﬁnancial
institutions. Evidence for a structural change is found for all interest
rates. The structural change occurred around the beginning of 2007 for
ﬁxed-rate mortgages and in mid-2005 for ﬂoating-rate mortgages. For all
mortgage rates, asymmetries are detected in the pre-break period. More
speciﬁcally, the adjustment of ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates is characterized
by downward rigidity, which supports the existence of some form of im-
perfect competition. By contrast, the rates of adjustable-rate mortgages
exhibit upward price stickiness. This result suggests that competition was
stronger in this speciﬁc mortgage-lending market. In the post-break pe-
riod, no clear evidence is found in favor of asymmetries with respect to
the adjustment coeﬃcient.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: E43, E52, G21, C23
Keywords: Interest Rate Pass-Through, Monetary Policy, Mortgages, Cointe-
gration analysis, Panel Data
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates how quickly and completely money-market rates pass
through to mortgage rates in Switzerland. It focuses on the mortgage lend-
ing segment because of its relevance for the Swiss economy. Housing costs,
and particularly rental charges, which are primarily driven by mortgage rates,
have an overproportional importance in the Swiss consumer price index, with a
weighting factor amounting to 20 percent. Mortgage rates thus indirectly aﬀect
forecasts of the Swiss price level. On the other hand, mortgage loans constitute
the bulk of Swiss lending to households and corporations. Between 2001 and
2010, their proportion relative to total bank domestic customer claims increased
from 73 to 82 percent.1 It is thus essential to the stability of the ﬁnancial system
to shed light on the dynamics of mortgage rates. Moreover, an understanding
of the adjustment of bank retail rates is central to the assessment of monetary
policy eﬀectiveness. By steering the target rate, central banks exert a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on banks’ price-setting behavior. In a ﬁrst stage, changes in the tar-
get rate aﬀect money-market and capital-interest rates with longer maturities.
These rates can be considered as banks’ marginal costs. A change in marginal
costs might in turn induce ﬁnancial institutions to adjust retail rates both on
deposits and on loans.
The literature related to the interest rate pass-through generally ana-
lyzes if changes in the marginal costs of funds are passed completely to banks’
retail rates and how quickly these rates adjust to their long-run equilibrium.
A sluggish adjustment is generically attributed to menu costs and asymmetric
information in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Many other factors
aﬀect the decision to adjust retail rates, such as expected bank exposure to
interest-rate risk, competition and regulation in various segments of the econ-
omy, costs associated with adverse selection and moral hazard, consumer inertia
and switching costs (Payne and Waters (2008)). The analysis of the transmis-
sion mechanism is thus multifaceted.
The present study examines the extent of interest rate pass-through from
a marginal cost perspective. In this context, rates set by banks equal a mark-
up over marginal costs, proxied by market rates with a matching maturity.2
This way of analyzing the pass-through is better known as the cost-of-funds
approach.3 Recent studies use panel methods to study the pass-through. For
instance, De Graeve et al. (2007) employ a panel data set of Belgian bank retail
rates and allow for heterogeneity in banks’ price-setting behavior by using ap-
1See http:\www.snb.ch.
2In the following, market rates generally refer to both money-market rates and capital-
market rates.
3See de Bondt (2002), Sander and Kleimeier (2004), de Bondt (2005), de Bondt, Mojon
and Valla (2005), Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) and De Graeve, Jonghe and Vennet (2007)
for euro area data.3
propriate econometric techniques that prove to be consistent with heterogeneity
at the micro level.
This is the ﬁrst paper to investigate the interest pass-through process in
Switzerland.4 It follows De Graeve et al. (2007) in analyzing the transmission
mechanism with panel data and considering heterogeneity in banks’ pricing
policies. At the core of the analysis are published (end-of-month) mortgage rates
of products with diﬀerent maturities. All rates apply to new transactions. The
pass-through is modeled by an error correction model. Asymmetries are studied
both with regard to the adjustment of retail rates to their long-term equilibrium
and to the sign of changes in benchmark rates. In other words, the analysis tests
whether banks adjust their mortgage rates faster: a) when they are above or
below their equilibrium, respectively, b) in periods of monetary tightening or
easing. Finally, a test for an endogenous structural break is conducted. The
sample period covers from April 2001 to December 2010.
This study contributes to the literature by including the ﬁnancial crisis of
2007–2009 and demonstrating that the transmission of mortgage interest rates
became faster during this period, which was characterized by a negative shock
to both the monetary policy rate and market rates. Furthermore, this paper
accounts for banks’ forecasts of the evolution of their funding costs by using
swap rates, which are based on current and expected future values of Libor
rates, as explanatory variables. Recent studies emphasize the importance of
incorporating the “forward-looking” behavior of banks into the analysis of the
pass-through (Banerjee, Bystrov and Mizen (2010)).
In the literature, there is a widespread consensus that bank interest rates
are sticky in the short term. In contrast, evidence for completeness of the long-
term pass-through is not uniform. It seems that the degree of the pass-through
varies across countries, ﬁnancial institutions, market segments and products.5
In addition, the transmission of monetary impulses is also inﬂuenced by the
length and timing of the sample period.6 Some studies provide evidence for
an asymmetric and heterogeneous price adjustment of retail rates. It has been
4Two studies that use Swiss data and deserve mention are Kalt (2001) and Bichsel and
Perrez (2005). Both investigate the credit channel of monetary transmission. The former
analyzes the balance sheet channel using balance sheet and proﬁt and loss account data from
corporate customers of one of the big banks in Switzerland. Kalt (2001) ﬁnds weak evidence
for an impact of monetary policy shocks on the investment behavior of Swiss ﬁrms. The paper
of Bichsel and Perrez (2005) uses individual banks’ balance sheet data to empirically study
the bank lending channel. The authors ﬁnd that the lending activities of better capitalized
banks are relatively immune to changes in monetary policy stance. However, the results are
not robust when the authors use a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.
5See, for example, Hannan and Berger (1991) for banks’ deposit rates, Cottarelli and
Kourelis (1994) and Borio and Fritz (1995) for corporate lending rates and Mojon (2000) for
both lending and deposit rates with diﬀerent maturities.
6See, among others, Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Kleimeier and Sander (2006), Gamba-
corta and Iannotti (2007) or Payne and Waters (2008).4
argued that the prevailing monetary policy conditions are crucial for under-
standing the asymmetric behavior of the pass-through process. In line with
the collusive-pricing hypothesis, Mojon (2000) and Gambacorta and Iannotti
(2007) ﬁnd that the pass-through to loan (deposit) rates is higher when these
retail rates are below (above) their equilibrium. In contrast, in accordance with
the customer-reaction hypothesis, Lim (2001) and Liu, Margaritis and Tourani-
Rad (2008)) provide evidence supporting the opposite view.
A strand of literature investigates how the pass-through in euro area
countries diﬀers across sub-periods after a structural break (Sander and Kleimeier
(2004), Marotta (2009)). For instance, de Bondt et al. (2005) document that
the pass-through process in the euro zone has become faster since the introduc-
tion of the euro, which stimulated competitive forces. Sander and Kleimeier
(2004) cover the time span between January 1993 and October 2002 and de-
termine an endogenous structural break. They conclude that the pass-through
of retail rates in the euro area has generally become faster in the post-break
period. By contrast, Marotta (2009), covering a similar time span as Sander
and Kleimeier (2004) and allowing for multiple endogenous structural changes,
concludes that the pass-through was generally less complete after the launch of
the single monetary policy, which he ascribes to an erosion of competition in
lending markets.
The main ﬁnding of this study is that the dynamics of the interest rate
pass-through diﬀer strongly between the rates for adjustable- and ﬁxed-rate
mortgages. This is clearly shown in a simple model with neither a structural
break nor an asymmetric adjustment. It emerges that the pass-through is very
fast and complete for ﬁxed-rate-mortgagerates, whereas it is sluggishand incom-
plete for interest rates of ﬂoating-rate mortgages. The analysis is complemented
by endogenously determining a structural break. For ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates,
the structural change occurred from the end of 2006 to the start of 2007, which
corresponds to the period just before the beginning of the recent ﬁnancial cri-
sis of 2007–2009. In contrast, for ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates, the estimated
breakpoint is April 2005. Finally, asymmetries with regard to either the adjust-
ment coeﬃcient or the immediate pass-through coeﬃcient are allowed for. With
respect to the former type of asymmetry, all mortgage interest rates seem to
adjust asymmetrically toward equilibrium in the pre-break period. Whereas in-
terest rates for ﬁxed-rate mortgages exhibit downward rigidity, suggesting that
banks were able to exert market power up to 2007, ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates
seem to exhibit upward price stickiness in the period before the structural break
occurred. When asymmetries with regard to the immediate adjustment coef-
ﬁcient are considered instead, it is found that banks react more quickly when
market rates fall. This result holds particularly for ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates
in the post-break period, which includes the recent ﬁnancial turmoil. Here, the
pass-through is found to be complete, and the long-term relation is immediately
restored. These ﬁndings demonstrate that a low-interest-rate environment stim-
ulates competition and that market power has decreased since 2007 for ﬁxed-rate5
mortgages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data used for the analysis of the interest rate pass-through in Switzerland.
Section 3 outlines the econometric methodology, and section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a
The mortgage rates used in this study are weekly published interest rates for new
mortgage loans.7 The interest rate series were collected by VermoegensZentrum
VZ in a survey covering both banks and other ﬁnancial institutions, such as
insurance companies, that are active in the Swiss mortgage business.8 For each
mortgage rate (ﬂoating-rate- and ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates with maturities of 2,
5, 7 or 10 years), a panel data set consisting of 23 banks between January 1998
and December 2007 is available. Because the VZ data were obtained only up to
December 2007, these mortgage rate series were “chain-linked” with the series of
published end-of-month Interest Rate Statistics for new transactions collected
by the SNB. The construction of a longer panel might raise concerns about
the data break in the series, which may aﬀect the results. However, the SNB
survey, which was introduced in January 2008, and the VermoegensZentrum
VZ survey use the same deﬁnition of mortgage interest rates for the purpose of
data collection. By taking the end-of-month ﬁgures of both data sets, balanced
panels for diﬀerent product categories are constructed in the period between
April 2001 and December 2010. The numbers of institutions included diﬀer
across mortgage products and range between 9 and 20 banks. All market rates
used as benchmark rates are obtained from the SNB.9 End-of-month ﬁgures
were selected for the set of possible benchmark rates.
Figure 1 plots the average mortgage rates by maturity, the average de-
posit rate, the beginning-of-month values of the 3M-Libor and the middle cor-
ridor for the 3M-Libor target range. Mortgage rates for products with a ﬁxed
maturity appear to evolve roughly in accordance with the 3M-Libor, whereas
this is not the case for products with a ﬂoating interest rate. Moreover, the
volatility of both ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates and deposit rates appears to be
7Note that mortgage loans for which interest rates are published in banks’ booklets or
on their websites are usually described in one of the following ways: “The interest rates are
indicative values only ... and apply to owner-occupied residential properties and primary
mortgages”, “and apply to top-quality residential property and borrowers with impeccable
creditworthiness” or “The interest rates shown apply to the ﬁrst mortgage with a loan up to
66 percent of the market value of the property”.
8See also http://www.vermoegenszentrum.ch for more details.
9The SNB obtains the money- and capital-market rates daily, either from data service
providers or from own calculations.6
lower than that of the target rate and of the ﬁxed-maturity-mortgage rates. The
strong price rigidity of ﬂoating-rate mortgages suggested by the ﬁgures may be
explained by the peculiarity of the Swiss rental market. Until August 2008,
rental payments were linked to the rate of adjustable-rate mortgages of the can-
tonal banks. Starting in September 2008, an average mortgage-rate index based
on the costs of all banks’ mortgage loans was introduced as the reference rate
for rental-payment adjustments. In Switzerland, an increase in interest rates on
mortgage loans can be partially rolled over to tenants, who represent a large
share of the Swiss population. The social impacts of rising mortgage rates are
obvious and cause pressure on the banking sector that may distort ﬁnancial
institutions’ pricing policies, although the state has taken no formal measures
to address this issue. Obviously, this problem is characteristic of ﬂoating-rate-
mortgage rates. The similar rigidity observed for saving deposit rates might
result from the fact that banks keep deposit rates artiﬁcially low when market
rates start to rise (Kroll (1995)). The Figure also demonstrates that the pe-
riods before and just after monetary policy easing are characterized by a low
volatility of ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates (Q1/2001 to Q2/2001 and Q4/2006 to
mid-Q3/2008). During these periods, the volatility of the Swiss term structure
(measured by the diﬀerence between the 10-year spot rate for bonds issued by
Swiss commercial banks and the 3M-Libor) was also very low. This ﬁnding
suggests that mortgage rates follow changes in market rates with a comparable
maturity.
The benchmark rates chosen in the analysis for the study of the pass-
through for ﬁxed-rate mortgages are swap rates of a comparable maturity.10
Swap rates are implied derivative prices constructed from Libor futures. In a
swap transaction (interest-rate swap, or IRS), two parties agree to exchange
variable interest payments (e.g., the 6-month Libor rate) for ﬁxed interest pay-
ments (e.g., a government-bond yield with a long maturity) on a notional prin-
cipal amount at regular intervals over a speciﬁed period. In 2009, the SNB
conducted a survey in which reference rates served as the bases for the prices
of various credit products. The results showed that the IRS curve is an im-
portant reference rate for the pricing of loans and motivates the choice of their
rates. Particularly, it emerged that ﬁxed-rate mortgages are predominantly
priced from the IRS curve.11 The rate of adjustable-rate mortgages is reset
10In spite of the strong co-movement between the saving-deposit rate and interest rates of
adjustable-rate mortgages illustrated by Figure 1 (the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.9), the pass-
through is viewed as the transmission of (exogenous) monetary policy impulses to retail bank
rates. Because ﬁnancial institutions set both saving-deposit and mortgage rates, the causal
relationship between the two rates is not clear.
11Interest-rate swaps are used to reduce interest-rate risk. For instance, a bank may fund
its ﬁxed-rate- (long-term) mortgage loans through savings accounts. Obviously, the ﬁnancial
institution incurs a maturity mismatch between the two types of business. To reduce this
type of risk by better matching the income streams on its assets to the payment streams on
its liabilities, the ﬁnancial institution can swap the ﬁxed-rate-interest-rate income generated
through its mortgage lending for ﬂoating-rate-interest-rate income (Whittaker (1987)). Con-
sequently, the funding costs for ﬁxed-mortgage rates are more closely related to these swap7
periodically according to various indices, which often include the operational
target of the central bank.12 The 3M-Libor is hence chosen as the benchmark
rate in the pass-through analysis of ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates.
3 Methodology
3.1 The Pass-Through Model
The interest rate pass-through is conventionally modeled by an error correction
term (ECT) representation:
rk,t = c0k + λkmt + uk,t (1)
where r is the mortgage interest rate, m is the benchmark rate, and k is
the ﬁnancial institution in the panel, and:
Δrk,t = c1k +Σ J
j=0αjkΔmt−j +Σ I
i=1βikΔrk,t−i + γkuk,t−1 +  k,t (2)
where the error correction term corresponds to the lagged estimated
residuals of the cointegration equation (1), γ stands for the speed of adjust-
ment to the long-run cointegrating equilibrium and α0 is the impact multiplier.
The optimal lag lengths are denoted by I and J, respectively.
Equation (1) represents the long-run relationship between mortgage in-
terest rates and market rates, and the short-run dynamics are described by
equation (2). The pass-through model is empirically studied by adopting the
approach of De Graeve et al. (2007). To study the short-run dynamics, all
aggregate coeﬃcients are computed as a weighted average of the bank-speciﬁc
estimators of equation (2). More speciﬁcally, the methodology proposed by
Swamy (1970) is used. Moreover, to analyze the long-run dynamics, the aver-
age long-run pass-through is estimated using the panel fully modiﬁed regres-
sion estimator of Phillips and Moon (1999). As indicated by De Graeve et al.
(2007), their speciﬁcation allows each bank to exhibit a diﬀerent immediate
rates.
12The survey’s results were not conclusive with regard to ﬂoating-rate mortgages. The most
common indices used for determining the interest rate of this type of loan are the 3M-Libor,
the bank’s internal interest-rate curve and other replicating approaches based on the Libor
and IRS curves.8
reaction to changes in the benchmark rate. For instance, the adjustment coeﬃ-









In this paper, the hypotheses of completeness of the long-run pass-through
coeﬃcient (λ = 1) and of the impact coeﬃcient (α0 = 1) are tested. In addi-
tion, the analysis tests whether the adjustment coeﬃcient γ diﬀers according to
whether mortgage rates are above (ut > 0) or below (ut ≤ 0) their equilibrium
level. Finally, this paper examines if the impact coeﬃcient (α0)i st h es a m ei n
periods of monetary tightening (Δmt > 0) and in periods of monetary easing
(Δmt ≤ 0).
Before proceeding to the ECT model implementation, it is necessary to
test for cointegration between the dependent and the independent variables.
3.2 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
Previousstudies on pass-throughhave found that interest rates are non-stationary.
The present analysis hence needs to take into account whether all interest rate
series contain a unit root, and, if they are I(1), whether mortgage rates and
benchmark rates are cointegrated. Only if cointegration is found can the ECT
model presented above be estimated.
3.2.1 Unit Root Test
Two unit root tests are performed: the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC) and
the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS) unit root tests. Both tests allow for
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and linear trends, but they diﬀer in their assumptions
about the autoregressive coeﬃcient. They consider the following model:
Δyit = αi + ρiyit−1 +Σ
pi
j=iβijΔyit−j +  it (3)
where i denotes the individual in the panel, and the lag order pi is de-
termined based on the AIC. LLC assumes a common unit root process, ρi =
ρ, and uses equation (3) to test the null hypothesis of a unit root, H0: ρ =0 ,
against the alternative of no unit root, H1: ρ<0. The IPS test allows for
individual unit root processes and is based on the null hypothesis that ρi =0
for all i against the alternative that H1: ρi < 0f o rs o m ei’s.9
3.2.2 Cointegration Test
The available techniques for panel cointegration tests are an application of the
cointegration analysis in the time-series dimension. The general approach is to
obtain residuals from the cointegrating equation and then to test whether they
are I(1) by running an auxiliary regression. Kao (1999), Pedroni (1999) and
Pedroni (2004) provide diﬀerent statistics for this purpose, all of which assume
homogenous slope coeﬃcients across panel units. Kao (1999) tests the residuals
ˆ eit of the OLS panel estimation by applying DF- and ADF-type tests:
ˆ eit = ρˆ eit−1 +Σ
p
j=1ϕjΔˆ eit−j +  it (4)
The null hypothesis of no cointegration, H0: ρ = 1, is tested against
the alternative of stationary residuals, H1: ρ<1. The ADF test used here is
appropriate for a cointegration approach with endogenous regressors.
When testing for cointegration in a heterogeneous panel by imposing
homogeneity across individual units of the panel, a non-stationary component
in the residuals is generated, which leads to a rejection of the cointegration
hypothesis even if it is true. In Pedroni (1999) and Pedroni (2004), various
methods of constructing statistics that deal with this shortcoming are discussed.
Two sets of statistics are proposed: the panel and the group mean statistics.
Incorporating heterogeneity leads to a slight modiﬁcation of equation (4):
ˆ eit = ρiˆ eit−1 +Σ
pi
j=1ϕjΔˆ eit−j +  it (5)
The set of panel statistics (panel-ν,p a n e l - ρ, the non-parametric panel-t 
and the parametric panel-t) is based on pooling the residuals along the within
dimension of the panel. They allow the cointegrating vectors to be homogenous
under the alternative. Heterogeneity is considered under the alternative in the
set of group mean statistics (group-ρ, the non-parametric group-t  and the
parametric group-t) which are based on pooling the residuals along the between
dimension of the panel. The null and alternative hypotheses are analogous to
those of Kao (1999).
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
To test for unit root and cointegration, the chosen benchmark rates described
above are used.10
The results for the two panel unit root tests are displayed in columns i
and ii of Table 1. The IPS test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mort-
gage rates are I(1). The LLC test rejects the null of a unit root for ﬂoating-rate-
mortgage rates. In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that all mortgage rates
exhibit the I(1) property and that they are stationary in their ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
forms (these results are not presented).13
The results of the cointegration tests are shown in columns iii-x of Table
1. The Pedroni residual-based cointegration tests fails to reject the null hypoth-
esis of no cointegration between ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates and their benchmark
rates at a high level of signiﬁcance. Only according to the panel-ν statistic,
adjustable-rate-mortgage rates seem not to be cointegrated with the 3M-Libor.
The Kao ADF-t-test is against the null of no cointegration for all products but
7-year and 10-year ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates. Overall, the results indicate clear
evidence in favor of cointegration. This leads to the choice of the ECT speciﬁ-
cation using the methodology of De Graeve et al. (2007) for the analysis of the
pass-through.
4.2 Analysis of the Interest-Rate Pass-Through
Table 2 reports the estimation results. The last column, λ =1 ,s h o w st h eW a l d
test statistics for the null hypothesis that the long-run pass-through coeﬃcient
equals one.
The results indicate that the long-term pass-through is incomplete for
ﬂoating-rate mortgages but complete for the interest rates of ﬁxed-rate mort-
gages. The result of a complete long-term pass-through of mortgage rates is
similar to those found by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)for lending rates and Bo-
rio and Fritz (1995) for several European countries; de Bondt (2002), de Bondt
(2005) and Banerjee et al. (2010)for lending rates in the euro area; Kok Sørensen
and Werner (2006) for mortgage rates in the euro area; and Fuertes and Hef-
fernan (2009) document a complete pass-through for mortgage lending in the
United Kingdom. Also, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) ﬁnd evidence for a complete
long-term pass-through of mortgage rates. This result is in line with the ﬁndings
of Banerjee et al. (2010). The authors implement a forward-looking model of
interest rate pass-through by allowing bank retail rates to depend on forecasts of
wholesale rates in addition to current and lagged changes of retail and wholesale
market rates and the long-term cointegrating relationship. In fact, they claim
13For all benchmark rates, various unit root tests in a time-series dimension were performed.
To save space, the results are not presented in this paper. The ADF tests do not reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root. The analysis is complemented by performing the KPSS unit
root test of the null of stationarity. The conclusion remains the same because the underlying
hypothesis can be rejected for all reference rates at conventional levels of signiﬁcance (5 and
10 percent). Moreover, the ADF test can be rejected for all market-rate series in their ﬁrst
diﬀerence form.11
that interest-rate expectations play an important role in the price-setting be-
havior of banks and that backward-looking models often understate the impact
of monetary policy impulses on bank interest rates. Because swap rates em-
body expectations of movements in future oﬃcial rates, they can be considered
as “forward-looking” market rates, which provides an explanation for the large
estimates found for the long-term coeﬃcients of ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates. The
transmission mechanism is hence found to be eﬀective.
The results provide evidence for short-term stickiness. The immediate
pass-through coeﬃcient, α0, ranges between 16 percent for rates of ﬂoating-rate
mortgages to 70 percent for rates of mortgages with a maturity of 10 years. For
ﬁxed-rate mortgages, more than 60 percent of the ﬁnal response is immediately
realized. Interest rates of ﬂoating-rate mortgages appear to adjust slowly, as
only a small fraction of the long-term pass-through is realized on impact. The
values for the mean lag θ indicate that banks restore the equilibrium relationship
after 3 months for ﬂoating-rate mortgages and after 4 to 5 months for ﬁxed-rate
mortgages.
4.3 Analysis of Non-Linear Adjustments
In this paragraph, the assumption that the adjustment speed of mortgage rates is
symmetric is relaxed. If, for example, the benchmark rate decreases without an
immediate adjustment of the retail interest rate, the error term  k,t will be posi-
tive. In the case that ﬁnancial institutions face menu costs and have some degree
of market power, their incentive to lower lending rates will be weak. Nominal
downward price rigidity and upward price ﬂexibility would thus be characteris-
tic of banks operating in an imperfectly competitive mortgage-lending market
(Sander and Kleimeier (2004)). By contrast, the higher the elasticity of the
loan demand, the greater banks’ incentive to adjust prices downward. If banks
have less market power, maintaining retail lending rates above their equilib-
rium value for a long period of time would lead to a loss of customers and a
corrosion of proﬁts outweighing the incurred adjustment costs. In this situa-
tion, one would expect a faster downward price adjustment. Scholnick (1996),
Lim (2001), Gambacorta and Iannotti (2007) and Marotta (2009) argue that
there are two diﬀerent views according to which asymmetries in the short-run
interest-rate adjustment can be interpreted: the customer-reaction hypothesis
states that lending rates have greater upward rigidity in a very competitive mar-
ket because customers react negatively when interest rates rise. In contrast, the
collusive-pricing hypothesis states that banks react more reluctantly to down-
ward adjustment of lending rates if they operate in a less competitive market
where customers are not able to switch to another service provider oﬀering bet-
ter conditions.
In line with the previous literature, asymmetries are modeled with the12
threshold autoregressivemodel (TAR0) developed by Tong (1983).14 In equation
(2), the adjustment coeﬃcient becomes:
γ =

It × γ if uk,t−1 > 0
(1 − It) × γ if uk,t−1 ≤ 0 (6)
where It is a dummy variable that equals one if uk,t−1 > 0. γ+ is the
coeﬃcient estimate obtained for times when uk,t−1 > 0, and γ− is obtained for
uk,t−1 ≤ 0. In addition, one can distinguish between two mean lags, one when
the disequilibrium is positive and one when it is negative. The adjustment speed
measure θ is: θ+ =
|λ−α0|
|γ+| and θ− =
|λ−α0|
|γ−| .
Alternatively, the response of bank rates to changes in market rates seems
to depend in some cases on the size and sign of market-rate changes.15 Simi-
lar to Marotta (2009) and Horvr´ ath, Krek´ oa n dN a s z ´ odi (2004), the test of an
asymmetric speciﬁcation for the short-term dynamics in equation (2) is imple-
mented by adding two regressors that capture contemporaneous positive and
negative changes in the benchmark rate. More speciﬁcally, α0 is allowed to take
on diﬀerent values according to whether market rates are rising or falling:
α0 =

Mt × α0 if Δmk,t > 0
(1 − Mt) × α0 if Δmk,t ≤ 0 (7)
where Mt is a dummy that equals unity if Δmk,t > 0. α
+
0 and γ+ denote
the short-run pass-through and the adjustment coeﬃcient, respectively, when
the benchmark rate rises, and α
−
0 and γ− apply for a falling market rate.
The results of the TAR model that considers asymmetries with respect
to the adjustment coeﬃcient are shown in Table 3, and those for the TAR model
that studies asymmetries with regard to the sign of changes in the benchmark
rate are presented in Table 4.
Only for ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates and for interest rates of mortgages
with a maturity of 10 years is evidence in favor of an asymmetric threshold model
with respect to the cointegrating relationship detected. The results suggest that
ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates are adjusted more rapidly when deviations from
the long-term equilibrium are negative. The equilibrium relationship is restored
14See also Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Kleimeier and Sander (2006) and De Graeve et al.
(2007) for applications of this technique. These studies allow the threshold to deviate from
zero. Here, it is set equal to zero to make the interpretation of the results more comparable
across mortgage products.
15See Borio and Fritz (1995), Mojon (2000), Sander and Kleimeier (2004) or Kleimeier and
Sander (2006).13
after one month when these mortgage rates are below their equilibrium level,
whereas the adjustment coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant when they are below it. By
contrast, the adjustment speed of interest rates for mortgages with a maturity
of 10 years is higher when rates are above their long-term relationship (two
months to attain equilibrium) than in the opposite case, where the adjustment
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.
The results provide no clear-cut evidence for an asymmetric adjustment
of mortgage rates over the sample period between April 2001 and April 2010.
Also, the existing literature is generally inconclusive with regard to asymmetries
of the pass-through of lending rates. Hofmann and Mizen (2004), Sander and
Kleimeier (2004), De Graeve et al. (2007) and Kwapil and Scharler (2009) con-
clude that mortgage lending rates exhibit a symmetric adjustment process. In
contrast, Mojon (2000), Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and Fuertes and Heﬀernan
(2009) ﬁnd that lending rates are more rigid downward than upward, whereas
Lim (2001) claims the opposite.
It is worth noting that asymmetries relative to the sign of changes in the
benchmark rate cannot be rejected. For all mortgage rates, the ﬁndings suggest
that negative changes in the benchmark rate are passed on to mortgage rates
more quickly than positive ones. This ﬁnding indicates that banks are more
reluctant to transfer increases in market rates than they are to lower mortgage
rates in the contrary case. For instance, 77 percent of a negative change in
the benchmark rate is immediately passed on to the rates of mortgages with a
maturity of 2 years, but only 34 percent of an increase in the 2-year swap rate is
immediately passed on. The results are robust across products. It takes roughly
2 to 3 months to restore equilibrium when the product-speciﬁc benchmark rates
are falling, whereas the mean lag is 6 to 12 months when market rates are rising.
4.4 Interest Rate Pass-Through and Structural Change
Analysis
Figure 2 traces the residuals resulting from the bank-speciﬁc long-run equation
(1) against time and shows a similar evolution for the rates of all mortgage prod-
ucts. The residuals are positive up to some point in time, particularly those re-
sulting from the cointegrating relationship between ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates
and the 3M-Libor. Thereafter, the regressions’ residuals are negative, showing
a trend toward zero. The residuals’ path points to a structural break in the
long-term pass-through.
Table 5 presents the results for the pass-through analysis for diﬀerent
sub-periods. Similar to Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Kleimeier and Sander
(2006) or Marotta (2009), the unknown structural break date in the cointegrat-
ing relationship is detected using a supremum F (supF) testing procedure over14
the middle 80 percent of the sample period.16
The Table reveals that the break occurred in April 2005 for ﬂoating-rate-
mortgage rates, and breakpoints for ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates are detected at
the end of 2006 and at the beginning of 2007.17 The results indicate that the
pass-through coeﬃcient was somewhat larger in the post-break period than in
the pre-break period. However, for mortgages with a very long maturity (7 or
10 years), the null hypothesis that λ equals one cannot be rejected in either the
pre- or the post-break sample period. Only for ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates, the
long-term pass-through is higher in the sample period between April 2001 and
April 2005 (40 percent) than in the sub-sample starting from April 2005 (24
percent) or in the full sample. The impact coeﬃcient is considerably higher in
the post-break period than in the pre-break period or over the entire sample. For
ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates, α0 is closer to unity in the shorter samples starting
from February 2007 and November 2006, respectively. Nonetheless, a Wald test
of the hypothesis that the impact coeﬃcient equals unity can be rejected for all
mortgage products and sub-periods. In conclusion, it seems that for mortgage
rates of products with a ﬁxed maturity, a structural break occurred in the run-
up to the recent ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009. Following the structural change,
these interest rates were immediately and almost fully adjusted as a result of
changes in the respective benchmark rates. This evidence is supported by the
ﬁndings of the mean lag lying very close to zero for all mortgage rates. Instead,
in the pre-break period, mortgage rates were adjusted more sluggishly, with
values for α0 ranging between 20 and 43 percent, which are remarkably lower
than those found in the analysis over the full available sample. The pass-through
of adjustable mortgage rates was more complete in the pre-break period, but
more sluggish than after April 2005.
Table 6 displays the results for the asymmetric TAR model with respect
to the adjustment coeﬃcient. The hypothesis of a symmetric adjustment cannot
generally be rejected in the pre-break period for any product, with the exception
of the 10-year mortgage rate. In contrast to the analysis over the full sample, it is
found that ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates were more rigid upward than downward
in the time span between April 2001 and April 2005 and that the rates of ﬁxed-
rate mortgages were adjusted more quickly during the pre-break period when
16See also Andrews (1993) and Hansen (1992) for more details on the methodology and for
the critical values.
17Unit root and cointegration tests were performed for all sub-periods. Pedroni’s panel test
fails to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in most cases for ﬂoating-rate mortgages
during the sample period April 2001 to April 2005 when both a constant and a drift are
included in the equation. The null hypothesis is always rejected when only a constant is
included. Both the LLC and IPS unit root tests reject the null hypothesis that the 10-year
mortgage-rate series are I(1) in the period November 2006 to December 2010 when both an
intercept and a trend are included in the equation. When including only an intercept, the test
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mortgage rates contain a unit root. Overall, the
tests provide evidence in favor of both unit root and cointegration despite the shorter sample
periods. All results are available upon request.15
they were below their long-term equilibrium.
The ﬁndings of this paper suggest that before the subprime crisis of 2007–
2009, ﬁnancial institutions were more prone to passing on market-rate changes
when rates of ﬁxed-rate mortgages were below their equilibrium, indicating that
banks were exerting some degree of market power (collusive-pricing hypothesis).
Starting in 2007, this asymmetric behavior vanished for mortgage rates with a
maturity of 5 years or less. By contrast, upward price rigidity is detected during
the pre-break period with respect to the interest rates for adjustable-rate mort-
gages, supporting the customer-reaction hypothesis. Analogous to what was
found for ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates, the interest rates for adjustable-rate mort-
gages have been adjusted symmetrically in the post-break period. A possible
interpretation of these ﬁndings is that banks faced relatively strong competition
in the market segment for ﬂoating-rate mortgages during the pre-break period.
Alternatively, upward price rigidities between April 2001 and April 2005 could
have been induced, on one hand, by the peculiarity of the Swiss rental market
and the consequent reluctance to raise the retail rates. On the other hand,
a quicker upward adjustment might not have been a convenient pricing policy
for ﬁnancial institutions. In the light of the strong co-movement between in-
terest rates for adjustable-rate mortgages and deposit rates, one expects that
an increase in the mortgage rate would be followed by an adjustment of the
deposit rate in the same direction. If the outstanding volume of deposits were
larger than that of ﬂoating-rate mortgages, the additional burden because of
interest payments would exceed the additional interest receipts. The volume of
ﬂoating-rate mortgages has been inferior to that of deposits since 2001/2002,
supporting the above argument.18 The asymmetric adjustment behavior disap-
peared in the post-break period. This could be a consequence of the decreasing
importance of this mortgage product. In fact, its volume contracted compared
to that of ﬁxed-rate mortgages. An increase in competition may also explain
the disappearance of asymmetries in the adjustment process of interest rates for
ﬁxed-rate mortgages after January 2007.
The analysis is extended to study the eﬀects of the sign of changes in
benchmark rates on the immediate pass-through coeﬃcient. Consistent with
the analysis over the full sample, Table 7 shows that, in the post-break period,
banks adjusted mortgage rates more quickly on impact in periods of monetary
easing than in times of monetary tightening. It is worth noting that the coef-
ﬁcient α
−
0 is equal to one in all regressions of ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates in the
post-break period. In other words, changes in the benchmark rate are immedi-
ately transmitted to the respective mortgage rates. Given that the pass-through
for products with a long maturity is complete in the long run, the eﬃciency of the
transmission mechanism improved dramatically in the post-break period, which
includes the recent ﬁnancial meltdown. Also, for adjustable mortgage rates dur-
ing the time span between May 2005 and December 2010, the impact coeﬃcient
18See also Swiss National Bank (2010).16
that applies to negative changes in the 3M-Libor is considerably higher than
that for positive ones. Speciﬁcally, 24 percent of a change in the benchmark
rate is immediately passed on to ﬂoating-rate-mortgage rates, so that the long-
run relationship is immediately restored. In sum, this study reveals that banks
react more eﬀectively to drops in market rates than to increases. This could
be a direct consequence of the fact that central banks change the operational
target rate by relatively larger steps when they lower it than when they raise
it. This was clearly the case during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009. In turn,
a low-interest-rate environment stimulates competition in the mortgage lend-
ing market. Similarly, other studies have documented that asymmetries in the
adjustment of retail bank rates are related to the magnitude of changes in the
monetary policy rate.19
5 Concluding Remarks
The present paper is the ﬁrst to analyze the interest rate pass-through from
money- and capital-market rates to mortgage rates in Switzerland. Moreover,
it is the ﬁrst to provide a preliminary analysis of the impact of the recent
ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009on the eﬃciency of the pass-through. Finally, by the
appropriate choice of the product-speciﬁc benchmark rates, it explicitly takes
into account the forecasts of future rates, giving a more accurate description of
the transmission mechanism.
Published rates for new transactions are used. Monthly rates of ﬂoating-
rate mortgages and ﬁxed-rate mortgages with a maturity of 2, 5, 7 or 10 years
are at the core of the analysis. The paper uses mortgage lending rates from a
panel of 20 ﬁnancial institutions over the time period from April 2001 to De-
cember 2010. The pass-through is modeled with a standard error correction
representation. To fully account for heterogeneities in the price-setting behav-
ior of ﬁnancial institutions, the panel version of the fully modiﬁed estimator
proposed by Phillips and Moon (1999) is used. The short-run equations are es-
timated using Swamy’s random coeﬃcient estimator. The appropriate marginal
pricing costs that ﬁnancial institutions incur when selling their products are
captured by employing market rates of a comparable maturity. This strategy is
known as the cost-of-funds approach. Swap rates represent the chosen bench-
mark rates for the interest rates of ﬁxed-rate mortgages and are ideal because
19Horvr´ ath et al. (2004) argue that if the central bank’s target rate changes by relatively
large steps, two opposite eﬀects inﬂuence the pricing behavior of banks. Higher market rate
volatility, often accompanied by larger changes in yields, induces a faster reaction as a result of
menu costs and banks’ willingness to smooth interest rates for their customers. On the other
hand, ﬁnancial institutions might perceive larger changes in the target rate as transitory.
This increases ﬁnancial institutions’ uncertainty and argues against a fast interest rate pass-
through. In fact, in the presence of menu costs, it is rational for banks to ignore temporary
market-rate changes.17
they include present as well as expected future monetary policy actions taken
by the central bank. A straightforward implication is that monetary policy im-
pulses determine banks’ costs of funds, which, in turn, directly aﬀect mortgage
rates.
It is found that the pass-through is complete but characterized by short-
term rigidities for interest rates of mortgages with a ﬁxed maturity. The recent
literature on the interest rate transmission mechanism stresses the importance of
incorporating expectations about future actions of the monetary policy stance.
Excluding such information from the analysis would underestimate the com-
pleteness of the pass-through. By using swap rates as key drivers of the rates
of mortgages with a ﬁxed maturity, the forward-looking behavior of banks is
considered. On the contrary, market rate changes are not fully transmitted
to the rates of adjustable-rate mortgages. For this type of product, the 3M-
Libor is chosen as a benchmark. Only roughly 24 percent of the initial change
in the benchmark rate is passed on to rates of ﬂoating-rate mortgages in the
long run. Moreover, the adjustment of these rates is very sluggish relative to
that of mortgage rates with a ﬁxed maturity because the immediate multiplier
amounts to only 16 percent of a 100-percent change in the 3M-Libor. By con-
trast, ﬁxed-rate-mortgage rates adjust more quickly on impact, with immediate
pass-through coeﬃcients between 60 and 70 percent. The particular character-
istics of the Swiss rental market could explain these contrasting results. Until
August 2008, rental payments were linked to the interest rate of adjustable-
rate mortgages of cantonal banks. Consequently, a high volatility of adjustable
mortgage rates was not admissible because large mortgage-rate increases would
be rolled onto tenants’ rents.
A second question analyzed in this paper is whether retail interest rates
exhibit asymmetric behavior with regard to both the adjustment coeﬃcient
and the signs of changes in the product-speciﬁc benchmark rates. For both
analyses, the threshold autoregressive model (TAR) developed by Tong (1983)
is used. Over the full sample, no clear evidence in favor of asymmetries with
respect to deviations of mortgage lending rates from their long-run equilibrium
can be detected. When studying non-linearities over diﬀerent sub-samples that
result from a search for an endogenous structural change, interest rates for
ﬂoating-rate mortgages are found to display upward price rigidity for the period
between April 2001 and April 2005. A possible explanation is that ﬁnancial
institutions may have been reluctant to increase the interest rates of adjustable-
rate mortgages in cases where marginal costs caused by rising deposit rates
exceeded the additional interest receipts from higher adjustable mortgage rates.
This is a plausible interpretation given the strong co-movement between the two
bank retail rates. In contrast, interest rates of ﬁxed-rate mortgages were found
to adjust more sluggishly downward than upward in the time span between
April 2001 and the end of 2006 (mortgages with a maturity of 10 years) as well
as between April 2001 and the start of 2007 (mortgages with a maturity of 2, 5
or 7 years). This ﬁnding supports the collusive-pricing hypothesis, suggesting18
that Swiss banks had some degree of market power in the ﬁxed-rate-mortgage
business during the pre-break period. No evidence for asymmetries is generally
found in the sample after the product-speciﬁc structural break.
Furthermore, banks clearly react more quickly on impact to falling bench-
mark rates than in the opposite case. This result is robust across products.
Particularly, this eﬀect is detected in the post-break period, where, for products
with a long maturity, both the immediate and the long-term pass-through seem
to be complete. Although the time span is quite short concerning ﬁxed-rate-
mortgage rates, this result points out that market-rate changes are transmitted
more eﬀectively when interest rates are falling, fueling competition in the mort-
gage segment. Alternatively, this result might merely be the consequence of an
asymmetric monetary policy (Blinder (1998)). In other words, central banks’
actions depend on the preferences for the tradeoﬀ between unemployment and
inﬂation and on whether the economy is in a phase of recession or in a boom.
Schaling (2004) shows that the target rate is a nonlinear function of the devia-
tion of the inﬂation rate from its target level and the output gap. For example,
a faster interest rate pass-through when market rates are falling might reﬂect
the central bank’s policies of increasing the target rate by smaller steps and
decreasing it more quickly.19
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Table 3: Asymmetric threshold adjustment of mortgage rates with diﬀerent maturities with
respect to the adjustment coeﬃcient
α0 γ+ γ− θ+ θ− Asymmetric model
Floating rate 0.162*** 0.008 -0.077*** 9.2 1.0 Yes
(0.027) (0.01) (0.012)
2-year ﬁxed rate 0.625*** -0.094** -0.072* 3.6 4.7 No
(0.032) (0.037) (0.039)
5-year ﬁxed rate 0.659*** -0.083** -0.057 4.2 6.1 No
(0.025) (0.033) (0.036)
7-year ﬁxed rate 0.663*** -0.128*** -0.027 2.8 12.9 No
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
10-year ﬁxed rate 0.692*** -0.165*** 0.012 2.0 28.0 Yes
(0.021) (0.045) (0.04)
Notes: Results based on equations (1) and (2) using an error correction representation with a sample from
April 2001 to December 2010 and a dummy variable equal to unity if uk,t−1 > 0. α0 denotes the immediate
pass-through, γ+,a n dθ+ denote the adjustment coeﬃcient and the mean lag, respectively, when uk,t−1 > 0.
γ− and θ− denote the adjustment coeﬃcient and the mean lag when uk,t−1 ≤ 0. θ is computed as
|λ−α0|
|γ| .
The column Asymmetric model shows the results of the Wald test (χ2 distributed) on the hypothesis that
an asymmetric threshold model is the preferred speciﬁcation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
below the point estimates. Signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level is, respectively, denoted by *, ** and
***. Source: SNB, VZ and own calculations.
1 signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.27
Table 4: Asymmetric threshold adjustment of mortgage rates with diﬀerent maturities with





0 γθ + θ− Asymmetric model
Floating rate 0.037 0.178*** -0.028*** 7.1 2.1 Yes
(0.035) (0.03) (0.005)
2-year ﬁxed rate 0.341*** 0.771*** -0.065*** 9.6 3.0 Yes
(0.046) (0.034) (0.014)
5-year ﬁxed rate 0.348*** 0.841*** -0.052*** 12.5 3.1 Yes
(0.038) (0.027) (0.013)
7-year ﬁxed rate 0.401*** 0.823*** -0.072*** 8.6 2.7 Yes
(0.044) (0.041) (0.014)
10-year ﬁxed rate 0.510*** 0.809*** -0.075*** 6.9 2.9 Yes
(0.046) (0.032) (0.019)
Notes: Results based on equations (1) and (2) using an error correction representation with a sample
from April 2001 to December 2010 and a dummy variable equal to unity if Δmt > 0. α
+
0 denotes the
immediate pass-through when contemporaneous changes in the benchmark rate are positive, whereas α−
0
is the immediate pass-through when changes in the benchmark rate are negative. γ is the adjustment
coeﬃcient. θ+ denotes the mean lag when Δmt > 0, whereas θ− is the mean lag when Δmt ≤ 0. θ is
computed as
|λ−α0|
|γ| .T h ec o l u m nAsymmetric model shows the results of the Wald test (χ2 distributed)
on the hypothesis that an asymmetric threshold model is the preferred speciﬁcation. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are reported below the point estimates. Signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level is,
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lower bound for target rate
Figure 1: Evolution of interest rates: mortgage rates, deposit rate and three-
month Libor rate
The Figure displays the evolution of interest rates (mean) for mortgage loans with diﬀerent
maturities, the deposit rate, the 3-month Libor rate and the operational target range for the
3-month Libor set by the Swiss National Bank. Source: VermoegensZentrum and SNB.32
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Fixed rate mortgages: 10 years
Figure 2: Scatter plot of the residuals from the long-run equation against time
The ﬁgure displays the regression residuals resulting from the bank-speciﬁc cointegrating
equations against time for mortgage loans with diﬀerent maturities. Source: own calculations.Swiss National Bank Working Papers published since 2004: 
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